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There has been growing recognition of the interests and needs of victims in the 
law arena, where previous emphasis had been predominantly on the rights of the 
accused and the offender.1 The result, in Ireland and in other jurisdictions, has 
been a series of  developments which seek to enhance their status in relation to 
the alleged wrongdoing. Via the deliberative capacity of domestic and EU 
legislatures drawing upon the (admittedly imperfect) opinion and will formation 
of its citizens,2  together with expansive judicial  interpretation of constitutional 
and convention texts, we are slowly discovering that rights in the criminal 
process are not confined to an exclusive caste, anchored to a fixed date in 
history. 
All of this impetus is largely inclusionary. The ‘axis of individualisation’3 in the 
criminal justice process − which for so long was directed only at offenders, the 
causes of their wrongdoing and their right to protection from the state − has now 
bifurcated to embrace the multi-faceted experiences of victimhood. This of 
course disturbs older, hegemonic ways of doing things (an accused/offender-
organising logic that infused a police–public interest-prosecutions-prisons 
model of justice) and the reified, exclusive voices of certain actors that were 
central to that process (prosecution and defence lawyers, policing authorities, 
and judges). Its recent emergence must be seen much more as a response to a 
previous scandalous neglect, as a justified attempt to correct an imbalance in 
which the victim was constituted as a ‘silent abstraction, a background figure 
whose individuality hardly registered’.4  
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how victims of crime are again 
being recognised as a ‘community of identity’.5 This reshapes the construction 
and presentation of intersubjective criminal conflict, not least because pluralism 
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of this kind generates competing interests, priorities and validity claims in the 
decision-making process. Momentum of this kind makes it more difficult to rely 
exclusively on tradition and previously settled conventions of practice. The 
criminal process is thus slowly moving from a monolithic culture of rights to 
cultures of rights that reflect ‘multiple identities’ which are deserving of 
concern and respect. 
 
The dominance of State-Accused relations 
Under the pre-modern exculpatory justice system which existed in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where wrongdoing was understood as a 
personal altercation, victims were given primacy as decision makers. They 
were, in essence, the principal claims-makers. Their ownership of the alleged 
wrongs meant that their voices – built largely upon subjective experiences - 
carried a powerful justificatory force. Personal referents and preferences were 
actively embraced as a vital currency in criminal relations, one which linked the 
parties most affected in the conflict to the justice network.6 
The criminal complex was gradually redrawn in the nineteenth century as a new 
statist administrative machinery emerged for investigating, prosecuting and 
punishing crime. Subjects increasingly ceded ‘their authorisations to use 
coercion to a legal authority that monopolises the means of legitimate coercion 
and if necessary employs these means on their behalf’.7   The penal field 
dissociated itself from the local, personal and arbitrary confrontations that 
governed criminal relations in the eighteenth century and became a more 
depersonalised, rule-governed affair with the State at the centre. Private disputes 
and vendettas were gradually monopolised by the State apparatus and rerouted 
into the courtroom. A society in which ‘the law operates more and more as the 
norm’8  slowly emerged − reflecting the ‘public interest’ and the ‘will of the 
people’ − in which the temptation to commit crime would no longer be 
countered by a sovereign will to command and a display of terror. When this 
process was completed, ‘sovereign power was transformed into a public 
power’.9  
In distilling the criminal process into a State-accused event, an ‘equality of 
arms’ framework was created as part of a broader Rule of Law value system. 
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This addressed the problem of the previously ‘bad economy of power’ which 
‘vested too much…on the side of the prosecution… while the accused opposed 
it virtually unarmed’.10 Redistributing this economy of power meant an 
expansion in the exclusionary rules of evidence that could be employed by the 
defence against the prosecution case,11 clearer and greater obligations imposed 
on the State to prove its case against the accused, better opportunities afforded 
to the defence to prepare its case and test the prosecution case, and the removal 
of any obligation of self-exculpation on the accused.  
Even when the case was proved against the accused, he or she was subjected to 
a new power to punish in which ‘an economy of continuity and permanence 
…replace[d] that of expenditure and excess’.12 Relations between the offence 
and the offender also became more equalised as a result of the specialised and 
professionalised knowledge that began to be constructed around the latter. This 
expertise of the offender has been referred to by Foucault as follows ‘ whole set 
of assessing, diagnostic, prognostic, normative judgments’ whole set of 
assessing, diagnostic, prognostic, normative judgments, concerning the criminal 
have become lodged in the framework of the penal judgment.13  Normalisation, 
regulation, intervention, individualisation, a ‘whole machinery’ of  ‘subsidiary 
authorities’ and experts – probation officers, social workers, educationalists, 
criminologists, psychiatrists, counsellors, psychologists -  generating a ‘corpus 
of knowledge, techniques, scientific discourses’14 around the actions of the 
offender and the readjustment of his or her lifecourse.  
A state-accused logic of action thus came to cast a long shadow over criminal 
process  relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, becoming the ne 
plus ultra for crime conflict resolution.  It defined the accused as the primary 
(exclusive) rights-bearer, with institutional practice heavily coordinated in 
accordance with this feature. Criminal wrongdoing was increasingly 
reconstituted as a public matter to be resolved almost exclusively through a 
dispassionate prosecution process. Localism and personalism, elements 
cherished under the old order, were actively jettisoned under this modern 
arrangement.  
This new institutional pattern quickly transcended the victim’s interaction with 
the crime conflict and re-shaped how it was presented, addressed, legitimated 
and concluded. Within such a depersonalised, bureaucratised system, the victim 
was displaced, confined largely to the bit-part role of reporting crime and of 
adducing evidence in court as a witness, if needed at all. In effect, victims of 
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crime thus became non-subjects, disenfranchised and dispossessed of all legal 
and claims rights. In modernity, the problem of criminal wrongdoing became a 
rationalised domain of action, a site which actively distrusted and excluded 
‘non-objective’ truth claims. The state, the law, the accused and the public 
interest became the principal claims-makers within this institutional and 
normative arrangement, an arrangement which would dominate criminal and 
penal relations for the next 150 years. Victims accordingly were no longer 
recognised (or recognisable) in the justice system, their non-status and non-
presence legitimate and legitimising features of the modern institutional 
process. 
The Re-Emergence of Victims of Crime as Stakeholders 
In the last four decades, justice systems are partially being reconstructed again, 
as they demonstrate an increased sensitivity to the needs and concerns of 
victims of crime. A  ‘vision of the victim as Everyman’ is part of a ‘new 
cultural theme’,15 one which is widely represented in social, political and media 
circles. A number of factors has facilitated this increased awareness of victims 
in western criminal justice systems.16 
Specific victimological studies became more prominent in the period after the 
Second World War and began to direct the criminological gaze away from its 
focus on offenders, towards a typology of victims’ experiences of the 
wrongdoing. These studies, among others, were important in generating 
academic interest in victims of crime. They were followed up by the 
introduction of mass victimisation surveys, commencing in the 1970s in the US 
before also being employed in the early 1980s in the UK, which among other 
things drew attention to the under recording of crime, repeat victimisation, fear 
of crime, and victims’ experiences with various criminal justice agencies such 
as the police, prosecutors, trial judges, and other court personnel. In the 
Republic of Ireland, mass crime victimisation surveys only commenced in 1998 
with the introduction of a crime segment into the Quarterly National Household 
survey.17 
The growth in the women’s movement also ‘raised the consciousness of women 
to the oppression of criminal violence’,18 facilitating ‘sustained discursive 
contestation’ about hegemonic views on crime.19 More specifically, increased 
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self-activism also ensured that victims of crime became more visible again. In 
Ireland, the revelations brought about as a result of inquiries over the last two 
decades into Church sexual abuse and institutional abuse − which occurred in 
the carceral archipelago that emerged post Independence – is now very much 
part of the Zeitgeist.20 Among other things, it has helped to raise experiences of 
victimhood in the collective conscience, and awareness of illegitimate and 
abusive hierarchies of dominance.  
Increasing concerns about rising crime rates in western countries from the 
1970s onwards, and the perceived failure of correctionalist criminal justice 
projects to rehabilitate offenders, have also had an impact. It is not surprising, 
according to commentators such as David Garland, that the ‘aim of serving 
victims has become part of the redefined mission of all criminal justice 
agencies’.21  This momentum has brought in to vogue the question: ‘What about 
the victim?’22 
 
Law as a steerer of reintegration23 
Law has also  helped to steer victim reintegration, confirming participation and 
protection claims for victims, whilst also seeking to secure the fair 
administration of justice. Considerations of process fairness now  include the 
victim within its conceptual framework. Whilst previously such deliberations 
were housed within the more remote medium of the ‘public interest’, the courts 
are now becoming more explicit in specifically identifying victims and 
competing rights.    Of course, the regulation of victim experiences in law 
necessarily involves a level of abstraction and institutionalisation that never 
fully captures all of the relevant exigencies. Nevertheless, and despite these 
shortcomings, increasing juridification of the crime conflict, is helping to 
overcome the previous ambivalence towards victims of crime. 
Domestic 
This subtle restructuring of the crime conflict in Ireland is evident, for example, 
in  Casey v DPP, Ireland and the AG  where Humphreys J. noted that ‘the 
criminal trial is a mechanism to vindicate the legal, constitutional, EU and 
ECHR rights of a victim of crime’ (my emphasis).24 Increasingly considerations 
of process fairness include the victim as a relevant determinant within its 
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paradigm of reference.    In countenancing rights and principles such as bodily 
integrity, life, privacy, participation and protection within this standard, a more 
accommodating − albeit challenging and contested − interpretation of fairness is 
developing, one that is not exclusively dominated by accused considerations. 
An illustrative example of this more inclusionary interpretation of fairness is to 
be found in DPP v Gerald McNeill, where Denham J noted in the context of a 
sexual abuse prosecution: “Facing into these types of prosecutions, which were 
becoming more common, the courts sought to achieve a fair trial with justice for 
all concerned. Those concerned include the people of Ireland for whom the 
prosecution is brought, the accused who has the fundamental right of a fair trial, 
and the victims (my emphasis).”25   
This severance of the victim class from more public interest considerations is, it 
is submitted, more than mere rhetoric.  It signifies an important turn in the re-
inclusion of the victim, a clear demarcation and express acknowledgement of 
her autonomous standing as a rights-holder. In addition to providing more 
significant normative protection, such a phenomenon is also breathing fresh life 
into aged criminal legal frameworks. Though oversimplified, the distinction 
between positive and negative rights is a useful heuristic in mapping the 
evolving journey of victims’ inclusion. Negative rights against the state are 
primarily vertical  – ‘to fend off dangers that can arise in the government-citizen 
dimension…that is, in the relationships between the administrative apparatus 
with its monopoly on the means of legitimate violence, and unarmed private 
persons’.26 Traditional interpretive patterns emphasised the ideological primacy 
of negative rights in the criminal process by focusing exclusively on the 
accused’s relationship with the conflict. This relationship was presented as fixed 
and unalterable, not least because of the immunities granted in constitutional 
and convention texts. Positive rights on the other hand, which are both vertical 
and horizontal, ground affirmative claims  to action  – such as  autonomy, life, 
privacy, bodily integrity, privacy and participation –  by an ‘interventionist state 
that provides infrastructures and wards off risks’.27 The culture of negative 
rights against the State is thus gradually coming in to contact with a newer 
culture of positive rights. The latter increasingly challenges the interest 
positions that the former narrowly protects, demanding recognition of the 
intersubjective dimensions of the conflict by both the State and the accused. 
Two cases in Ireland in the 1980s provide insights into the nascent (and fragile) 
emergence of a more intersubjective approach to criminal prosecutions. The 
first case,  People DPP v JT, has been described by Charleton J as laying ‘the 
foundation stone of a victim’s charter’ in Ireland’.28 Traditionally, the spouse of 
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an accused was not competent to give evidence for the prosecution in a case, 
except in the case of rape or violence perpetrated on that spouse).  This was 
justified on the basis of marital unity (the law made no distinction between the 
accused and the spouse) and the importance of preserving marital harmony. The 
constitutionality of this rule was challenged in this case.  The complainant was a 
20 year old woman who had Downs Syndrome who alleged that she had been 
sexually abused by her father. At trial the spouse of the accused and the 
complainant’s mother gave evidence that at the end of a television programme 
concerning child sexual abuse, her daughter expressed delight that the 
wrongdoer in the programme was eventually brought to justice. As a result of 
questioning her daughter on the issue, it emerged that the complainant’s father 
had allegedly perpetrated similar abuses as those illustrated on the programme. 
The accused was convicted but appealed on the basis, inter alia, that his spouse 
was incompetent to testify for the prosecution. In upholding the conviction, 
Walsh J examined the common law rule and declared that its application on the 
facts of the cases would be in violation of Article 41 of the Constitution which 
protected family rights. He also noted:29 
It could be strongly argued that this rule should no longer be sustained 
because of the fact that in the modern age with the independence of 
women, married or otherwise, and the recognition of the equality of men 
and women, both within and out of marriage, such a distinction could 
only be regarded as outmoded and unreal.  
Section 21 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1992, as amended, now provides that 
in any criminal proceedings a spouse of the accused is competent to give 
evidence for the prosecution. Such a spouse, however, is only compellable to 
give evidence at the instance of the prosecution in the case of an offence which 
involves violence or the threat of violence to the spouse, a child of the spouse or 
of the accused, or any person who was at the material time under the age of 18 
years, or is a sexual offence alleged to have been committed in relation to a 
child of the spouse or the accused, or any person who was at the material time 
under the age of 18 years.  
In the People DPP v Tiernan30 the Supreme Court was asked to provide 
guidelines which the courts should apply in relation to sentences for the crime 
of rape. Though rejecting the idea of guideline judgments, the Court stated that 
a non-custodial sentence for rape is wholly exceptional.  
Finlay CJ noted:31  
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The act of forcible rape not only causes bodily harm but is also inevitably 
followed by emotional, psychological and psychiatric damage to the 
victim which can often be of long term, and sometimes of lifelong 
duration…Rape is a gross attack upon the human dignity and the bodily 
integrity of a woman and a violation of her human and constitutional 
rights. As such it must attract very severe legal sanctions. They are of 
such a nature as to make the appropriate sentence for any such rape a 
substantial immediate period of detention or imprisonment. 
He went on to note that neither a victim's previous sexual experience, ‘nor the 
fact that she could be considered to have exposed herself by imprudence to the 
danger of being raped’, could be considered as a mitigating circumstance in any 
rape.32 Though now obvious, such statements  shed light, to some extent,  on the 
embedded nature of State-accused relations. When located in its historical 
specificity, the judgment can be considered to be very important in setting out   
guiding principles in relation to sentencing for the offence. In particular, the 
Court recognised both the seriousness and multiplicity of harms caused by the 
offence of rape. It also noted that any mitigating factors would be limited in 
respect of the offence, and that the appropriate sentence will almost always be a 
substantial period of imprisonment.33 In doing so, the Court moved the 
discourse away from an almost exclusive focus on welfarist considerations 
relating to the offender (particularly the emphasis on mitigating factors) to 
incorporate more deliberation on the seriousness of the offence, the subjective 
dimensions of the harm caused, and the extent to which mitigating factors – 
particularly sexist ones -  should be permitted or entertained  in respect of the 
offence.     
This increasing accommodation of victims/witnesses in the criminal 
process is also evident in other areas. The previously fossilised exclusionary 
assumptions underpinning the perception of some victims/witnesses in our 
justice system is evident, for example, in the law on the corroboration of sexual 
complaints. In the past the evidence of a complainant in a sexual offences case 
required a mandatory warning to the jury on the dangers of acting on such 
evidence alone. This rule was justified ‘by the fear that complaints of sexual 
offences may sometimes be the product of spite, jealousy, psychological denial 
of having consented, or a reaction to having been jolted; that women with 
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nothing to lose might seek to subject a man of high social standing to 
blackmail; and that the accusation of rape is easily made, but difficult to 
defend’.34 More recently, however, these essentialised notions about the traits 
and motives of sexual complainants have largely been abandoned and the trial 
judge now has a discretion whether or not to give such a warning to the jury.  
 
The same is true of the traditional common law approach to the previous sexual 
history of a complainant. Such evidence was previously admissible provided it 
was relevant. Once relevant, a trial judge was obliged ‘to allow unpleasant 
charges to be made against the complainant in connection with her past’.35 If 
admitted, such evidence of sexual reputation was employed to cast serious 
doubt on the trustworthiness of a female complainant, the probative link 
between sexual reputation and suspicion about the veracity of a complaint being 
fixed and clear. The destructive assumptions entrenched in the common law—
particularly the reinforcement of sexist stereotypes—were thus employed to 
undermine the credibility of victims as witnesses especially on the question of 
consent. But the dynamics have changed in more recent times and the 
Legislature has attempted to counteract such ‘folkloric’ and sexist 
assumptions.36 
The law on marital rape was also imbued with sexist ideology. A husband 
was previously exempted from liability for the rape of his wife. This was 
premised on a rule enunciated by Hale that a husband could not be guilty of 
rape ‘committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual 
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given herself up in this kind 
unto her husband which she cannot retract.37 The marital rape exemption was 
abolished in Ireland in 1990. 
This more inclusionary approach for witnesses and victims  is now to be 
found in a myriad of disparate issues that arise in criminal law and criminal 
process jurisprudence including leave for judicial review,38  the defence of 
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provocation,39  the inclusion of evidence potentially probative of guilt,40  delay 
in sexual abuse cases,41  trial prohibition on the grounds of delay,42  and the 
right to have recourse to a criminal trial where there is reasonable evidence and 
the trial can be conducted fairly.43   
It is also evident in the employment of intermediaries,44 live television links and 
video testimony for witnesses and victims of crime;45 the abolition of the 
mandatory requirement on judges to warn juries of the dangers of convicting on 
the basis of uncorroborated or unsworn victim/witness testimony;46 the removal 
of wigs and gowns when conducting an examination in chief or cross-
examination of a child witnesses;47 the protection of the identity of victims in 
sexual offence cases;48 reformulations of the definition of consent in sexual 
offence cases,49 separate legal representation for rape victims where an 
application is made to admit previous sexual history;50 the reduction of victim 
alienation through the use of victim impact statements;51 the provision of legal 
aid in limited circumstances;52 the ability of the DPP to appeal unduly lenient 
sentences;53 the provision of reasons for decisions not to prosecute;54 and 
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provisions for the payment of compensation to victims in respect of any 
personal injury or loss caused by a crime.55  
In more recent years the system has also witnessed a far less rigid 
approach to the circumstances in which the spouse of an accused is competent 
to testify for the prosecution in criminal proceedings;56 a greater awareness of 
the reasons why a complainant may not have made a complaint of a sexual 
offence at first reasonable opportunity but still avail of the doctrine of recent 
complaint,57 a relaxation of the exclusionary rules on opinion evidence in 
certain circumstances;58 the introduction of a provision which make it clear that 
the absence of resistance by a victim in a rape case does not equate with 
consent;59 the admission of pre-trial statements;60 the introduction of measures 
to restrict unjustified imputations at trial against the character of a deceased or 
incapacitated victim or witness;61  the exclusion of persons guilty of murder, 
attempted murder or manslaughter from taking a share in the estate of the 
victim;62  the introduction of an exception to the rule against double jeopardy 
when new and compelling evidence becomes available;63  the construction of a 
more ‘contextualised’ understanding of fairness in historic child sexual abuse 
cases by, inter alia, no longer aligning delays in prosecuting with presumptive 
prejudice;64 the introduction of bail conditions requiring a bail applicant to 
refrain from going to specific locations or to meet specified persons; attempts to 
regulate the disclosure of counselling records;65 and, a more secular, 
intelligibility driven approach to the determination of certain witnesses’ 
competence to testify at the trial of an accused.66 The courts are now also 
willing to admit background evidence in criminal cases, often to render 
comprehensible relationship between the accused and the complainant.67  
 
Two notable statutes were also introduced in 2017, both of which seek to ensure 
the better accommodation of victims/witnesses in the criminal process. The 
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Criminal Justice (Victims of Crime) Act 2017 introduces a number of 
provisions including the right to information which will be provided to victims 
on first contact,68 in relation to investigations and criminal proceedings,69 and 
decisions regarding prosecutions.70 Other significant developments in the Act 
include the requirement that the Gardaí or the DPP are to provide victims with 
reasons for decisions not to prosecute a crime71 and the introduction of a process 
for formally reviewing a decision not to prosecute.72 The Act also provides for 
the protection of victims by, among other things, creating a mechanism for the 
submission of complaints;73 prescribing the manner in which interviews and 
medical examinations are conducted;74 requiring assessments to determine 
protection needs;75 the employment of protection measures at investigation 
stage (advice regarding personal safety or the protection of property; safety or 
barring orders; or applications to remand in custody or to have conditions 
attached to bail) and court stage (the avoidance of contact between victims and 
offenders during the course of criminal proceedings);76 the broader use of victim 
impact statements;77 and the employment of special measures for a much 
broader range of offences than currently available at investigation stage (the 
conduct of interviews by a person of the same sex; the use of specially trained 
interviewers; the employment of premises designed for the purpose of 
conducting interviews) and court stage (tv links, intermediaries, screens, and 
restrictions on questioning about a victim’s personal life).78 This is a significant 
extension of the availability of the special measures which are available in the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1992, which were previously only available for a limited 
number of offences.79  
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 increases protection for victims 
of sexual offences including a procedure for regulating the disclosure of 
counselling records in sexual offence trials;80 the use of screens as a special 
measure for those that are under the age of eighteen and are testifying in a 
sexual offences trial;81 and restrictions on the personal cross-examination of 
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witnesses who are under 18 years of age.82  A final important development in 
the Act is the introduction of harassment orders which may be imposed upon 
convicted sex offenders when passing sentence or at any time before their 
release from prison. Such orders may prohibit the respondent from 
communicating with the victim and order the respondent to stay within a 
specified distance of the victim’s home, workplace or any other place 
frequented by the victim.83   
In addition, the boundaries of criminalisation are continually being 
extended to officially censure forms of conduct that can cause serious harm. 
These include offences such as harassment, coercion,  intimidation,  human 
trafficking,   child trafficking and pornography,   threats to kill or cause serious 
injury,  threats by phone or text message,  endangerment,  abduction,   staking 
and revenge porn,  withholding information on certain offences against 
vulnerable persons,  reckless endangerment of a child,  and the introduction of 
post conviction orders to protect victims from harassment  by offenders.  The 
labelling of misconduct has also been expanded by the abolition of common law 
defences such as reasonable chastisement   and the marital exemption in relation 
to rape.   There has also been legislative and judicial clarification of what 
constitutes reasonable self-defence in the home.  In addition to a broadening 
spectrum of criminalisation, mechanisms of intervention in harmful contexts 
have also been provided for in law. These include provisions in relation to child 
and adult safety  in emergency situations;  the possibility of using a portfolio of 
care and supervision orders for children;   the availability of protection, safety 
and barring orders under the Domestic Violence Act 1996;  child safeguarding 
and child harm reporting requirements;  broader disclosure requirements;  the 
provision of health services to women who worked in the Magdalen Laundries 
or similar institutions;   the payment of compensation to the victims of 
uninsured and unidentified motorists as a result of agreements  between motor 
insurance companies and the Minister of Local Government;  and protected 
disclosure of child abuse and wrongdoing in health care settings.  
Victims of crime also have recourse to the civil jurisdiction on the courts. 
Indeed such a pathway is viewed as a necessary pillar in the vindication of an 
individual’s rights. The Irish courts have been expanding jurisprudence in the 
field in recent years, particularly in relation to appropriate damages,84 delays in 
taking actions,85 broader interpretations of vicarious liability for acts of sexual 
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abuse,86 new torts,87 and the admissibility of convictions.88 The issue of whether 
prosecution authorities should enjoy an immunity from suit has also come under 
closer scrutiny. Traditionally it has been held that the Garda Síochána and the 
prosecuting authorities of the State did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care in 
relation to bona fide actions and decisions taken in carrying out their functions 
in the investigation and prosecution of crime.  More recently, the Supreme 
Court has held that such cases should now be heard at trial.89 This was justified 
on the basis that domestic tort jurisprudence is capable of being tested against 
the Convention, particularly having regard to whether or not a rule establishing 
absolute immunity for public authorities is proportionate. 
 
International Legal Instruments 
A number of key developments in Europe have also promoted recognition of the 
needs of victims within criminal justice systems. The impetus provided by the 
United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union has been 
significant. The European Convention on Human Rights, which Ireland 
incorporated at a sub-constitutional level in 2003, is increasingly  been 
interpreted in ways that afford rights to victims of crime. It therefore acts as 
another influential normative framework that seeks to extend the reach of rights 
in the criminal process to include victims of crime.   Though the Convention 
does not explicitly refer to victims of crime, the jurisprudence of the Court has 
placed obligations on member states to criminalise wrongdoing, to take 
preventive operational measures, to protect society from potential dangers, to 
provide appropriate civil remedies, to investigate and give reasons, and to 
adequately protect victims and witnesses at various stages in the criminal 
process. These obligations arise under Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (degrading 
treatment), 6 (fair trial) and 8 (private life) and have been analysed in a variety 
of cases.  In 1996, for example, the court in Doorson v The Netherlands90   
expanded its interpretation of Article 6, primarily concerned with the rights of 
defendants in criminal proceedings, to take account of the rights of vulnerable 
witnesses and defendants. It noted:  
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It is true that Article 6 does not explicitly require the interests of 
witnesses in general, and those of victims called upon to testify in 
particular, to be taken into consideration. However their life, liberty or 
security of person may be at stake, as may interests coming generally 
with in the ambit of Article 8 [right to a private life]. Such interests of 
witnesses and victims are in principle protected by other, substantive 
provisions of the Convention, which imply that Contracting States should 
organise their criminal proceedings in such a way that those interests are 
not unjustifiably imperilled. Against this background, principles of fair 
trial also require that in appropriate cases the interests of the defence are 
balanced against those of witnesses or victims called upon to testify (my 
emphasis). 
A series of other obligations and safeguards have been interpreted through the 
provisions. They include, for example, the requirement that States carry out 
effective investigations of crime.91 Effectiveness in this context requires public 
scrutiny to ensure accountability in practice;92  an efficient and independent 
judicial system;93  the hierarchical and institutional independence of those 
responsible for the investigation of a crime from those implicated in the 
events;94  prompt responses by the authorities;95  the effective implementation of 
court orders to protect victims;96  and a legal and administrative framework that 
adequately protects rights such as bodily integrity and privacy.97  
The European Court of Human Rights has also held that the accused’s right to 
disclosure of relevant evidence is not absolute and may need to be weighed 
against competing interests including the protection of witnesses and the need to 
uphold individual fundamental rights.98  It has also held that personal cross-
examinations by defendants should be subject ‘to a most careful assessment’ 
given their potential to beach the rights of complainants under Article 8,99  and 
that out-of-court statements may be admitted having regard to the need to 
‘weigh in the balance the competing interests of the defence, the victim, and 
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witnesses, and the public interest in the effective administration of justice’.100  
The Court has also repeatedly emphasised the positive requirement that States 
take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdictions.101  
The European Court of Human Rights has also addressed the issue of 
vulnerability and victimhood in Ireland. Jurisprudence from the Court indicates 
that there is an enhanced State responsibility to protect children and vulnerable 
adults that are in the purview of the State and to ensure that the investigation 
and trial processes for such witnesses are as efficient and protective as possible.  
In O’Keeffe v Ireland102  the applicant attended a national school in west Cork 
where she was sexually assaulted on 20 occasions by the Principal in a six 
month period commencing in 1973. An earlier complaint by a third party 
relating to the sexual misconduct of the principal had been made to a local 
parish priest, who acted as the manager of the school, in 1971. This complaint 
was not reported to the Gardaí, the Department of Education and Science or to 
any other state authority and was not acted upon by the parish priest. The 
applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Principal and the Irish State 
claiming damages for personal injuries suffered as a result of the sexual abuse.  
In relation to the hearing against the State, the High Court in Ireland held that 
the State was not vicariously liable for the sexual assaults of the principal. This 
was upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court. The applicant then took a case to 
the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that there had been a violation of 
Art.3 regarding the state’s failure to fulfil its obligation to protect the applicant. 
The applicant also argued that there was a lack of an effective remedy regarding 
the state’s failure in this regard. 
Given the fundamental nature of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 and the 
vulnerable nature of children, the Court accepted that the Irish Government had 
an inherent obligation to ensure the protection of children from ill-treatment in a 
primary education context. The key issue was whether the State’s framework of 
laws including its methods of detection and reporting provided effective 
protection for children attending a national school against the risk of sexual 
abuse, a risk of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge of at 
the relevant time. The Court held that the Irish state was in breach of Article 3 
in not adopting appropriate measures and safeguards to protect vulnerable 
individuals.  These measures should have included effective mechanisms for the 
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detection and reporting of any ill-treatment by and to a state-controlled body. 
The Court also held that the applicant did not have an effective domestic 
remedy available to her as regards her complaints under Article 3, which 
resulted in a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.  
All of this jurisprudence demonstrates that a literal, formalistic approach to the 
Convention has been rejected in favour of a broader reading that encompasses 
principles which command, that ‘rules in the rule book capture and enforce 
moral rights’.103 Such an expansionary interpretation acts as a counterpoint to 
the hegemonic dominance of state/accused relations and the exclusiveness, in 
particular, of accused rights as ‘trump cards’.  
This concretisation of the rights of the victim found expression in other 
international instruments. They include the UN Declaration of Basic Principles 
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985), and various  
Council of Europe Recommendations since 1983.104 The EU first began to 
consider crime victims in 1999, ultimately leading to a specific Directive.105 It 
became operative in participating Member States on the 16th November 2015 
and provides legal safeguards around three key themes: information and 
support; protection and; participation. While the Victim’s Directive is an 
extremely important measure for victims of crime within the EU, it is just one 
of a suite of measures which aim to assist and protect victims of crime. In 
addition to the Victim’s Directive, several measures aimed at specific categories 
of victims have also been introduced by the EU in recent years. The Directive 
on Trafficking in Human Beings, adopted in 2011, aims to combat trafficking in 
human beings and to protect its victims.106  The Directive establishes minimum 
standards in relation to criminal offences and sanctions and introduces 
provisions to strengthen the prevention human trafficking and the protection of 
victims.  In the same year, the Directive on Child Sexual Exploitation, aimed at 
combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child 
pornography was adopted.  It establishes minimum standards in relation to 
‘criminal offences and sanctions in the area of sexual abuse and sexual 
exploitation of children, child pornography and solicitation of children for 
sexual purposes’.107  
Two measures have also been adopted which enable victims to continue to 
benefit from protection measures issued in one member state while travelling in 
or moving to another member state. The first, the Directive on the European 
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Protection Order (EPO),108 allows victims with a protection order in criminal 
matters issued in one Member State to request a European Protection Order 
which applies in other member states.    The second, the Regulation on mutual 
recognition of protection measures in civil matters, enables victims with a civil 
law protection order to invoke it in another state.109  Finally, a Directive on 
compensation to crime victims ensures that victims can access state 
compensation when they are victims of violent intentional crime and that 




Writing victims in to the criminal justice story necessarily creates disturbances 
and establishes competing tensions.  Most commentators would accept that 
these tensions and disturbances are necessary so as to create a more 
communicative and accommodating criminal process, one which permits 
victims to recover, to some extent, their centrality in ‘the conflict’. Juridification 
of the kind outlined above will undoubtedly impact upon State-accused 
relations. Synthesising sometimes competing rights and principles in ways that 
will ensure just and fair decisions will be a challenge.  It will require an on-
going constructive interpretation of fresh cases that come before the courts. 
Such interpretation demands both fidelity to existing legal precedents (‘formal’ 
style reasoning) as well as an acceptance of the innovative possibilities of law 
and rights (‘grand style reasoning) given their evaluative aspects and potential 
for alteration through rules of change.111    
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